By SoEun Park
Research Paper
Foreign Affairs
Introduction: Imperative of Addressing North Korean Human Rights
As North Korea is one of the most repressive countries in the world, it comes as no surprise that the human rights situation in North Korea is in dire need of attention. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) defines human rights as “rights processed by all individuals by virtue of being human, regardless of their status as citizens of particular states or as members of a group or organization.” Along with the lack of freedom of movement, right to information, health, food, water, and sanitation, breach of economic, social, and cultural rights, repression of dissent, arbitrary arrests and detentions, these universal and undeniable human rights are evidently not held in North Korea, and is an imminent issue that has increased distress and urgency in the international community. The government has “continued to suppress basic liberties, including expression, religion, civil society, and union rights, and banned political opposition, independent media, civil society, and trade unions.” Although there were attempts to improve human rights conditions in North Korea, such as the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004 (which made it easier for North Korea to gain political asylum in the U.S.), these efforts were unsuccessful in improving the situation within North Korea itself. Furthermore, the COVID-19 epidemic has isolated the country more than ever due to border closure and travel restrictions. In light of these factors, the international community faces a pressing urgency to address North Korea’s human rights concerns backed by substantial evidence implicating crimes against humanity. The international community can approach the North Korean human rights crisis in two ways: through the neoconservatism confrontational approach and the engagement and pressure approach. After exploring the merits and criticisms of approaches, I argue that the latter approach will ultimately lead to better human rights conditions in North Korea.
The Neoconservative Approach on North Korea
To improve North Korean human rights, the international community can utilize the more confrontational neoconservative approach, which the United States has previously used. When discussing North Korea, neoconservatives have taken on a one-size-fits-all approach and have viewed the country as a “totalitarian” system following the Soviet model. The current U.S. policy towards North Korea is elucidated by the “mistrust of arms control treaties with the Soviet Union in the 1970s,” finding “its parallel in rejecting the Agreed Framework in the 1990s.” A similar hesitation to engage North Korea economically stems from the belief that expanding trade relations would have strengthened the Soviet Union. Essentially, neoconservatives want to pressure North Korea from the outside, which involves pressuring the states with isolationist policies, punishments, and sanctions. In addition, their foreign ideology has revolved around seeking and pushing for regime change. Thus, it is evident that neoconservatism is hawkish on foreign policy questions and tends to favor regime change in North Korea rather than approaching human rights issues foremost. In particular, they emphasize issue linkages, which would link denuclearization negotiations with human rights in North Korea. Further, neoconservatives wanted to include human rights issues in the six negotiations––the “series of multilateral negotiations held intermittently since 2003 and attended by China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program.” As they view North Korea as an unpredictable and dangerous rogue state, they are not willing to be flexible with denuclearization, linking it to human rights and, ultimately, regime change. The neoconservative approach emphasizes the strict stance it maintains on human rights in North Korea and will rely on mechanisms such as isolationist policies, punishments, and sanctions to impose inflexible pressure on North Korea to address human rights issues.
Considering Downs, Roke, and Barsoom’s argument for “enforcement school” adds depth and provides an interesting framework for understanding how North Korean human rights issues are related to compliance and cooperation levels. Despite the fact that the enforcement school doesn't represent the same ideologies as neoconservatism, there is a lot of overlap as their confrontational nature is very similar. Understanding their argument allows us to compare the “engagement school” and “managerial school” that we will discuss later in this paper, as they are already engaging in interesting conversations about their differences. Downs, Roke, and Barsoom emphasize that recent research findings in international regulatory regimes reveal a flaw in the “managerial school” argument, which asserts that compliance in international treaty regimes is notably high and accomplished with minimal emphasis on enforcement. They argue this perspective has been “dangerously contaminated by the selection process.” Due to the fact that states are more likely to sign treaties that are easy to comply with, most treaties require little change in the status quo. Therefore, they maintain that this is the main reason as to why noncompliance has not been a considerable problem, and little enforcement has been required. To overcome these selection problems, Downs, Roke, and Barsoom highlight the need to measure the “depth of cooperation”––the extent to which an agreement includes the collective shared benefits through perfect cooperation in a particular policy area. Here, their basis for judging the level of compliance is measured by treaty level. Controlling for depth of cooperation, Downs, Roke, and Barson found that enforcement might pose a more substantial issue than the “managerial school” believes in. As states have refrained from deep cooperation, they concluded that it is more likely that deep cooperation will require more enforcement than shallow cooperation. Therefore, increased enforcement measures might be necessary for specific instances and treaties that demand deep cooperation, as the “managerial school” has primarily focused on and analyzed treaties that require shallow cooperation.
Paradoxically, despite what Downs claims about states signing treaties that are easy to comply with, North Korea has ratified human rights treaties that contradict its abuse of human rights, making it a unique case. According to Human Rights Watch, “North Korea has ratified five human rights treaties: the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).” However, North Korea is still committing “crimes against humanity, including extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and forced abortion” that the 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on human rights reports. This is contradictory to the evidence that suggests that human rights treaties are not empty commitments and that “countries that ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the main treaty that the UNHCR monitored, were held to a higher standard in the dispensing of punishment than other countries were.” Thus, human rights in North Korea is a distinctive case where, despite formally endorsing several human rights treaties that theoretically hold to a higher standard due to this act, North Korea is actively deferring from these human rights treaties. In addition, the impact of both the reputation regarding human rights, which can either support or hinder a state's efforts to enhance its standing in more consequential areas of interest, and public shaming, which involves internalizing norms and principles for exerting social influence and encouraging norm-abiding behavior through the dispensation of social rewards and punishments, doesn't influence North Korea's conduct as anticipated, as highlighted by Lebovic. This once again emphasizes the unique nature of the North Korean case. Moreover, Downs, Roke, and Barsoom's argument of "depth of cooperation" encourages the interpretation that the human rights issue in North Korea is a type of deep cooperation in the case of North Korea as they have agreed to uphold human rights but are actively deferring from their agreements. North Korea's human rights issues can be regarded as a "deep cooperation" as “the extent to which it requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence” would have been significant. Even though North Korea is clearly deviating from the treatments, if it weren't for human rights treaties, there would be a higher likelihood of North Korea straying from the current trajectory of improving human rights even more severely than the current state. Thus, this type of deep cooperation unique to North Korean human rights might require more enforcement. As North Korea is actively breaking the human rights treaties and noncompliance is ruthlessly evident in the country, neoconservatives and proponents of the "enforcement school" are likely to advocate for increased enforcement measures involving isolationist policies and sanctions aimed at pressuring North Korea to comply with the provisions of these human rights treaties.
Criticisms of the Neoconservatism Approach
However, neoconservatism's confrontational approach to North Korea has been largely contested by its critics. Neoconservatives, again emphasizing “one size fits all” solutions, ignore the differences between North Korea and former communist countries like the Soviet Union. There is no civil society in North Korea; having been thoroughly isolated from the rest of the world, a single family has controlled the country for three generations, and the people must demonstrate complete loyalty to the family and the current leader, Kim Jong-un. Utilizing a vast surveillance and informant network, the state also controls everything and actively spies on its citizens. Thus, outside human rights organizations cannot find partners inside North Korea due to these barriers. According to Keck, when channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for a conflict, “domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from the outside,” resulting in the “boomerang effect.” However, although several NGOs have been active in North Korea since the mid-1990s, “their work is relatively limited in scope,” and they cannot directly search out international allies to bring pressure to incite change. It is critical to note that there is a distinct difference between the North Korean Human Rights issue and other historical human rights instances, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The 1975 Helsinki Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe endorsed post-WWII borders in Europe and human rights. It provided a focal point for civil society, legitimating human rights advocacy, information, and networking. In this case, the Eastern European groups could communicate with each other with the assistance of outside human rights organizations, “contributing to the development of direct communication and cooperation among relevant state institutions and non-governmental organizations.” This showcases how communication is critical to cooperation in the area of human rights and how communication and cooperation are interrelated to each other. Thus, it remains impossible to approach North Korea similarly to former communist countries without communication and partners for human rights organizations and NGOs. Transnational advocacy networks will be difficult to form for North Korean human rights as groups in this network “share values and frequently exchange information and services” that require “voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange,” which is not feasible in North Korea. In addition, critics may argue that the primary rationale behind connecting denuclearization talks with human rights issues in North Korea could be driven by neoconservatives seeking regime change rather than a genuine commitment to improving human rights. Hence, if they only care about regime change at the essence, this delegitimizes their argument about the need for the enforcement approach regarding human rights issues. Although some may argue that regime change may be favorable in the long run, it may trigger an unforeseen enormous humanitarian crisis in North Korea if approached carelessly. Hence, the neo-conservatism approach to North Korea’s human rights issues can be criticized for its ignorance of North Korea as an isolated state and its potential hidden agenda of North Korea’s regime change.
The Engagement Approach on North Korea
A better approach that can be utilized by the international community to improve North Korean human rights is the engagement and pressure approach, which South Korea has advocated in the past. More engagement invariably leads to more linkages inside the country, which can influence the human rights situation in the target country better than isolating the country; there is much more room for influence by engaging North Korea first. A great example from which we can learn is the Helsinki Process, which led to “greater cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe.” Considering the Helsinki Process and Accords in the context of North Korea, we can draw lessons from this historical case and examine how these can inform our understanding of North Korea’s human rights situation. The critical goals of the Helsinki Process were to improve the living conditions of the people living in the former Soviet bloc, strengthen indigenous movements promoting liberalization, and encourage regime change from within, which would be essential for the situation in North Korea. Aimed at reducing tension between Soviet and Western blocks, the heads of 35 countries signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (The Helsinki Accords) in 1975 on four general topics: (1) security dimension, (2) economic dimension (3) human dimension (humanitarian and cultural cooperation and (4) a follow up in the conference.
In the same way the Helsinki Process was intended, an engagement process between North and South Korea with the support of the international community could be initiated, which also agreed on the four baskets the Helsinki Accords proposed: security, economic, humanitarian, and a follow-up conference. The security respect for North Korea and cooperation in economics, science and technology, and environment, in addition to humanitarian and cultural cooperation, will be the foundation of the engagement process. This will allow for easier access to humanitarian aid, improving the real conditions of people and human rights in North Korea. In addition, there were commitments from Western countries to respect the existing orders; the fundamental principles guiding the relations between the participating states included sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the conference later continued with a follow-up meeting and is today institutionalized as the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. A follow-up conference for North Korean human rights would increase accountability and transparency of the cooperation. International organizations can facilitate this cooperation, establishing legal liability, reducing uncertainty, and reducing transaction costs. This follow-up conference would create the pressure that would follow the engagement approaches with North Korea, creating more accountability and increased information sharing.
Moreover, as discussed earlier in the paper, these commitments to the Helsinki Accords would contradict what the neoconservatives would argue for. Neoconservatives tend to favor intervention without a strong emphasis on respecting sovereignty. Thus, in the case of North Korea, they wouldn’t respect North Korean orders and sovereignty. Furthermore, they may not consistently prioritize human rights and fundamental freedoms, as they may not be genuinely deeply invested in these principles. This brings us back to the point of why the engagement approach to North Korean human rights is a better approach than the neoconservative approach. Thus, the engagement and pressure approach and the processes and lessons learned in the Helsinki process and accords can better increase cooperation from North Korea.
Chayes and Chayes’ argument for the “managerial school” elicits the interesting nature of international agreements and the extent to which nations will comply regarding their efficiency, interests, and norms. In “On Compliance,” they provide three main propositions that frame their discussion: (1) the level of compliance with international agreements is inherently unverifiable by empirical procedures, (2) compliance problems very often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking based on a calculation of interests and advantage, and finally (3) that the treaty regime as a whole need not and should not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compliance that is “acceptable” in the light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to safeguard. They illustrate how when nations enter into an international agreement, “they alter their behavior, relationships and their expectations of one another over time by its terms” and “will to some extent comply with the undertakings they have made.” Furthermore, they portray a variety of reasons for non-complying behavior, including ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language, limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their undertakings, and temporary dimensions of the social and economic changes. The “managerial school” that Chayes and Chayes advocate is similar to the engagement approach to North Korea, arguing that a country that agrees to a treaty will ultimately modify its behavior. They contend that if they do not modify their behavior, there are other grounds for the causes of their noncompliance.
For North Korea, the most significant reasons for noncompliance may be the COVID-19 pandemic and the recent sanctions against North Korea that are causing rapid changes in the North Korean economy regarding strategy and management. Thus, aiding North Korea in its efforts to reform and develop the economy could help change its behavior toward human rights from noncompliance to compliance and motivate them to comply with social norms. There may also be the problem of ambiguity when trying to improve dispute resolution procedures, especially when talking about the linkages to nuclearization. Using the engagement approach that is similar to the “managerial school” approach, with technical assistance, financial assistance, and engagement and management can assist with resolving the capacity deficit that could affect human rights and increasing transparency, which in turn can lead to national policy decisions aligned with international human rights standards. Hence, assistance in various areas that Chayes and Chayes support without linkages to denuclearization will eventually lead to more compliance with North Korean human rights standards.
The engagement approach will allow for effectively applying eventual pressure on North Korea. Following this engagement and more compliance with human rights, opportunities for transnational advocacy networks might open up more in the country. Along with efforts at persuasion, socialization, and pressure for human rights in North Korea, these networks could utilize four typology of tactics: (1) information politics, (2) symbolic politics, (3) leverage politics, (4) accountability politics.” For North Korea, all the four types of typology are favorable to increase the human rights conditions in the country. Information politics can “quickly and credibly generate politically usable information” about North Korean human rights and “move it to where it will have the most impact” such as international organizations; symbolic politics can “call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away”, which can derive domestic and international anger and call to action. Further, leverage politics allows the networks to call upon powerful actors such as the United States and China “to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have an influence” and accountability politics will aid in holding North Korea to their “previously stated policies or principles.” This is why adopting the engagement strategy will eventually pressure North Korea to fulfill its human rights commitments and ensure accountability, ultimately contributing to an improved human rights landscape. Therefore, the engagement and pressure approach is more likely to allow for more linkages, be less costly and intrusive, and be a straightforward and usual policy solution for noncompliance instead of increased enforcement measures that may lead North Korea to defy immediately.
Criticisms of the Engagement Approach
Nevertheless, there are also drawbacks to the engagement approach that is similar to the “managerial school” approach that Chayes and Chayes advocate for. According to Downs, the “managerial school” has a dim view of both formal and informal enforcement measures, views noncompliance as problems to be solved rather than violations to be punished, and concentrates on improving dispute resolution procedures, technical and financial assistance, and increasing transparency. However, without any initial pressure or punishment, the engagement approach might not affect North Korea’s noncompliance with human rights and improve the human rights conditions in the country as there will be less pressure and incentive for them to change their behavior. In addition, managerialism claims that “dynamics of cooperation differ across policy areas, just as they may vary within the same policy area over time,” such as human rights. Nonetheless, Downs argues that the relationship between enforcement and depth of cooperation is not as different as one might have expected or hoped. Even when considering human rights as a category with more noncompliance for certain states like North Korea, the noncompliance in the human rights area when North Korea has ratified certain treaties shows that merely an engagement approach might not be sufficient for compliance. While these are valid criticisms and we cannot dismiss them, the engagement approach remains the better approach since the benefits outweigh the drawbacks; the drawbacks are not to the extent of neoconservative criticism. Further, I also argue that the engagement approach allows for more pressure later on, when there are already a lot of collaborative measures outside and within the human rights arena. Adopting an approach that combines engagement followed by pressure could be most effective, providing a pathway for improved compliance with human rights conditions in North Korea.
Conclusion
Therefore, I argue that the engagement and pressure approach will ultimately lead to better human rights conditions in North Korea compared to the confrontational neoconservative approach. The engagement and pressure approach will advocate for an effective international response and reliance on international human rights standards and treaties, along with the compilation and dissemination of information about human rights, which will be essential. While the neoconservative approach may have its merits, the North Korean human rights situation will only improve when there is increased information, symbolism, accountability, and leverage from transnational advocacy networks, financial and technical assistance, as well as collaboration on other issues such as security and economics. Thus, the intentional community can act with a broad range of actors, including the government, international organizations, and NGOs, to enhance the human rights situation in North Korea and bolster compliance, addressing the dire and urgent situation through these remedial efforts.
Photo: Damir Sagoli/Reuters
Works Cited:
“What Are Human Rights? ,” OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/what-are-human-rights.
“Human Rights in North Korea,” Amnesty International https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/north-korea/report-korea-democratic-peoples-republic-of/
“World Report 2021: Rights Trends in North Korea,” Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/north-korea#:~:text=A%202014%20UN%20Commission%20of%20Inquiry%20on%20human%20rights%20in,abortions%2C%20and%20other%20sexual%20violence
Feffer, John. “Human Rights in North Korea and the U.S. Strategy of Linkage.” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2006.
Jacob Heilbrunn, “The Neocons Strike Back,” The New Republic, December 16, 2023, https://newrepublic.com/article/156266/neocons-strike-back
“The Six-Party Talks at a Glance.” The Six-Party Talks at a Glance | Arms Control Association, 2022. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. “Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism.” International Organization 52, no. 2 (1998): 380. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898753162866
“World Report 2019: Rights Trends in North Korea,” Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/north-korea
James H. Lebovic and Erik Voeten, “The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2006): 861–88, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x, 868
“North Korea’s Human Rights: What’s Not Being Talked About,” BBC News, February 18, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44234505
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics: Introduction,” Activists beyond Borders, 2019, 1–38, https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801471292-002, 12
“Non-Governmental Organizations Activities in North Korea,” EveryCRSReport.com, March 25, 2011, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R41749.html
“The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, accessed December 16, 2023, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/osce/basics/finact75.htm
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics: Introduction,” Activists beyond Borders, 2019, 1–38, https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801471292-002, 9
“Helsinki Final Act, 1975,” U.S. Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/helsinki
“The Helsinki Process and the OSCE,” The Helsinki Process and the OSCE, accessed December 16, 2023, https://www.csce.gov/helsinki-process-and-osce/
Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, “45th Anniversary of the Helsinki Accords (01 August 2020),” France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, accessed December 16, 2023, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/
Robert Keohane, “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,” Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy., 1984, 31–46, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400820269-004
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, accessed December 16, 2023, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706888, 176
Jangho Choi, “Why North Korea Chooses Self-Sufficiency: Changes in the North Korean Economy in the First Quarter of 2021,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3901657
“Human Rights in North Korea: Addressing the Challenges | Brookings,” Brookings, July 28, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/human-rights-in-north-korea-addressing-the-challenges/
Comments