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Writer's pictureSoEun Park

Convergence of Threats: Unpacking Anti-Asian Sentiment Amid National Security, COVID-19, and White Nationalism in American Society

By SoEun Park

Research Paper

Governance & Society




INTRODUCTION

There has been a dramatic increase in anti-Asian violence and discrimination in the United States since the COVID-19 outbreak. Media reports cite increasing reports of harassment, bullying, and attacks against the AAPI community. However, discrimination against Asian Americans is not a novel phenomenon. Most Asian Americans have been treated as foreigners throughout their long history in the United States as a result of discrimination and exclusion; examples include the Japanese American internment camps during World War II, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which barred Chinese citizens from naturalization until the 1940s, and the anti-Muslim, anti-Sikh, and anti-South Asian sentiment that followed the 9/11 attacks. In addition, Asian Americans are frequently held up to the stereotype of the “model minority,” which portrays them as intelligent and hardworking. Despite its positive connotations, this marginalizes people who don't fit the stereotype, erases diverse social and economic disparities between different Asian ethnic groups, perpetuates harmful narratives that ignore their diverse experiences, and is frequently used as a weapon against other marginalized communities, especially black and brown populations. Furthermore, as Kim suggests, the “model minority” stereotypes, combined with “threat” stereotypes, lead to the image of an especially competent outgroup that may create further harmful divisions. 


Many of the recent violent incidents in the United States were fueled by anti-China political rhetoric that blamed AAPI communities for the COVID-19 outbreak. According to the National AAPI Power Fund, 60 percent of likely voters in the eight battleground states and California stated that they believe that political leaders’ anti-China rhetoric is responsible for an increase in violence and hate towards Asian Americans as of November 2023. This political rhetoric of U.S. leaders has contributed to reinforcing established narrative frames that unify political backing and public sentiment against a shared “enemy.” This is also known as scapegoating, which involves unjustly assigning blame to a particular group for societal problems, a political tactic that garners vote by fueling hostility and adversity towards marginalized communities.


Akin to discrimination, scapegoating is similarly not a new phenomenon. In the late 1800s, Chinese laborers were unfairly blamed for declining wages in the American West, resulting in the expulsion of Chinese populations from at least 168 communities, often through threats, harassment, violence, and bans on Chinese immigration that persisted in most cases until 1943. Similarly, during the Great Depression, an estimated 500,000 Mexican Americans—half of whom were citizens of the United States—were deported after the American government unfairly blamed them for the country's financial difficulties. Furthermore, Black people have been falsely accused of violent and impoverished crimes from the time of enslavement till the present, which has resulted in wrongful arrests, accusations, even police killings. According to the National AAPI Power Fund data, voters can "see through the scapegoating" and understand the connection between the rise in violent crimes against Asian Americans and the inflammatory rhetoric politicians utilize.


Due to persistent tropes like the “perpetual foreigner” narrative, which reinforces the idea that Asians and Asian Americans are permanent outsiders in America, and the “yellow peril,” which depicts Asia and Asians as threats to the West, Asian Americans are frequently easy targets. Consequently, politicians and the general public may take advantage of such stereotypes. Though there has been an upsurge in anti-Asian hate crimes and violence as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the inconspicuous factors behind this sentiment remain uncertain. Thus, in this research paper, I ask the question: “What factors contribute to the increase in anti-Asian sentiment in the United States?” 


This research question is valuable as it explores the core reasons for the rising anti-Asian sentiment in the United States, which has significant implications for providing a fertile ground for anti-Asian prejudicial attitudes, racism, and violence against the Asian American community. It also explores the impact of political discourse and public opinion domestically, and how these influence and reinforce one another within the framework of anti-Asian hostility. This has ramifications for domestic politics as well because widespread anti-Asian prejudice can permeate perceptions of China as a threat to national security. This research aims to provide insight into the ways that political discourse and public opinion are influenced by the growing anti-Asian sentiment, which has ramifications for domestic politics, international affairs, and racial relations. This paper ultimately demonstrates the critical need for effective strategies and policies that can mitigate the negative impacts of such anti-Asian sentiment, such as scapegoating and fear-mongering. 


LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, anti-Asian sentiments have been rapidly increasing in the United States, as evidenced by increased anti-Asian violence and discrimination. It is also unequivocal that mainstream U.S. media have become increasingly anti-China and have been inundated with “China bashing,” as people blamed the pandemic on China. The increasing political rhetoric of high-ranking elite leaders demonstrates how public opinion and political discourse reflect this pattern. Such distorted representations have consequences that go beyond matters of diplomatic relations since they feed existing prejudices and misconceptions about Asian populations which currently exist. Such misrepresentations not only deepen already-existing divisions between social groups, but they also undermine international efforts to promote mutual understanding and collaboration between China and the United States. 


Previous studies investigated the relationship between public opinion and political discourse in the context of the growing anti-Asian sentiment on both a national and international level. On the one hand, some studies have compared the political rhetoric of various state leaders and the public’s opinion since the outbreak of COVID-19 on a global scale. These studies suggest that the pandemic was directly linked to political rhetoric in different countries during its outbreak. This highlights the importance of political leadership worldwide in handling the pandemic and adjusting rhetoric to suit the local societal dynamics. These studies examine how leaders address the pandemic through public messages, which has practical implications for building trust and effective response within a country. For example, leaders who emphasize global ideals foster international collaboration, while those who use more nationalistic rhetoric may not. Research also suggests that governments at different levels are struggling to combat the spread of misinformation, conspiracy theories regarding the virus’s origins, and additional instances of fear-mongering and racism online, especially on social media. 


Furthermore, studies have found that the public’s opinion of Asians has become increasingly hostile worldwide, as seen in newspaper and magazine articles. Comparative analysis also compares anti-Asian sentiment between two countries; for instance, Tan et al. found that the increase in anti-Asian sentiment is patterned differently across the United States and Australian contexts and socioeconomic groups.


On the other hand, one body of research investigates the COVID-19 effects on political rhetoric and public opinion, specifically in the United States. The United States is showcased with the emphasis on political rhetoric among politicians; former U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently labeled the illness as the “China virus” or “Wuhan virus,” often attributing blame for the disease to Chinese and Asian populations as evidenced by various studies, highlighting the politicization of the pandemic. In addition, the portrayal of the COVID-19 crisis echoed historical patterns of negative attitudes and discrimination against Asian Americans, exacerbated by the virus being labeled as the “Chinese virus” or “China virus”, both offline and online. Donald Trump and his supporters frequently used such language, which was echoed in mainstream media, contributing to the spread of anti-Asian sentiments. Recent studies have shown a correlation between hashtags like #Chinesevirus and anti-Asian sentiments on platforms like Twitter.  Furthermore, investigations into Trump’s “Chinese Virus” tweets suggest a significant increase in anti-Asian incidents, particularly in countries that supported him in the 2016 presidential election. Similarly, analyses of Twitter networks reveal Trump’s influential role in framing discussions around the virus, reflecting broader political communication strategies during crises. This stigmatizing language not only perpetuates biases but also fuels discriminatory behavior against Asian Americans, highlighting the detrimental effects of media portrayal on public health and welfare. Emotional rhetoric characterized by fear and hope, shapes public responses to the crisis, with populist actors such as Trump leveraging emotional appeals to shape perceptions of the pandemic’s severity and political narratives. Furthermore, Trump’s use of dysphemism and war metaphors in his speeches demonstrates the power of language in shaping public opinion during the pandemic, conflated with Trump’s biased views.


Furthermore, previous studies have been focused on evaluating how the increasing prevalence of COVID-19 has impacted anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. According to the data gathered in these studies, there was certainly an extensive amount of anti-Asian sentiment in the United States following the COVID-19 pandemic, and media coverage of China's role in the outbreak further encouraged prejudice and discrimination against Asian Americans. Specifically, Sawyer concluded that the degree of exposure to COVID-19 is associated with attitudes, suggesting that the “circumstances of the pandemic are related to increased anti-Asian attitudes.”  Some studies also investigate changes in racial sentiment before and following the emergence of COVID-19 through social media, especially race-related Twitter tweets, concluding the phenomenon of increasing Anti-Asian sentiment since the pandemic.


Few research studies have examined the relationship between race and security implications in the context of relations between the United States and China. Previous research investigates how racialized perceptions of Asians influence American foreign policy preferences toward China, laying the theoretical groundwork for international relations scholarship on race and power dynamics. They argue that as dominant states like the U.S. encounter rising powers such as China, racialized views intensify, fueling heightened threat perceptions and support for aggressive policies against the emerging power, finding an increase correlation between anti-Asian sentiment, anti-Asian violence and hawkish policy preferences explained by part by heightened perceptions of threat from China. Other research claims that exceptionalism tends to predict more hardline preferences and explores the implications for intergroup relations when exceptionalisms intersect. This suggests that this amplifies fear of the outgroup and fosters coercive responses, leading to the emergence or intensification of security dilemmas. Some research also challenges traditional views that emphasize uncertainty about security dilemma intentions by highlighting how racism affects the security dilemma that arises between nations. Employing theories from social psychology and neuroscience to investigate this notion, integrating racism into the understanding of security challenges suggests that racial identity variations can exacerbate disputes. This implies that racism, particularly in the context of the United States and China, could fuel international insecurity spirals. 


Nevertheless, there are gaps in explanations that are missing from the literature. Firstly, there is a consensus that such forms of harassment disproportionately impacts the Asian community, and lacks a valid and justifiable reason. However, many existing explanations lack substantial evidence and frequently rely more on speculation than rigorous analysis. Comprehensive examination and comparison of numerous variables is lacking, which hinders efforts to fully comprehend the phenomenon. Furthermore, it is important to consider the historical presentation of Asians as carriers of disease, which has perpetuated preconceptions and fostered a sense of contamination. This "othering" of Asians, which is rooted in the ideas about cultural distinctions, collides with immigration-related narratives to paint Asians as an origin of disease transmission. 


There has been substantial discussion regarding COVID-19 as an important factor in the rise in anti-Asian sentiment globally and nationally, but very few studies have investigated the political rhetoric of United States leaders other than former president Trump, or examined other factors leading to an increase in anti-China rhetoric from 2017 to 2024. Thus, my current research attempts to do exactly this, integrating prior research on rising anti-Asian sentiments while considering a variety of variables. In doing so, I posit that the possibility of confluence of (1) the perceived escalating national security threat from China to the U.S., (2) the appearance of the COVID-19 crisis, (3) increasing white nationalism and MAGA Movement, have led to the increase in anti-Asian sentiments in the United States. This study is important as it provides insight into understanding prejudicial attitudes during the COVID-19 pandemic and the dynamics of US-China relations amid domestic turmoil and international tension. 


DEPENDENT VARIABLE

My dependent variable is the rise in anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. To “measure” or observe the increase in Anti-Asian sentiment while building a broader data picture, this variable will be operationalized through three avenues: (1) how U.S. Lawmakers have discussed Asian Americans on social media from 2016-2022, (2) how much Asian Americans feel like they belong from 2021-2024 and (3) anti-Asian discussions on social media platforms like Quora. These channels provide valuable insights into the shifting landscape of attitudes and rhetoric surrounding Asian communities. A comprehensive framework for anti-Asian sentiments can be constructed by combining these three sets of operationalizations not only from high official and public discourse, but also from 2016-2023, which encompasses periods when COVID-19 was not at its peak, such as pre-COVID and “post-COVID”. 


Firstly, data from the Pew Research Center on how American lawmakers discussed Asian Americans on social media between 2016 and 2022 will be used to operationalize the dependent variable. This will illuminate how these influential figures—whose speeches have the power to drastically shape public perceptions and social norms—discuss Asian Americans, monitoring official and informal policy attitudes that may serve to legitimize the proliferation of prejudice against Asians. This data also captures the period from 2016-2022, which focuses on the pre-COVID period. According to the Pew Research Center, lawmakers’ mentions of Asian Americans on social media have been increasing from 2016-2019, but have significantly increased in 2020,” the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.



Figure 1: How U.S. Lawmakers Have Discussed Asian Americans on social media (Pew Research Center) 


Secondly, surveys on Asian Americans' sense of belonging will be used to operationalize the dependent variable. These surveys will measure the feelings of inclusion or exclusion that Asian Americans experience on an individual basis. These surveys, which were carried out between 2021 and 2024, provided insight into the anti-Asian perception pattern that emerged following the COVID-19 crisis, which peaked between March 2020 and the following year in 2021. Nearly 80% of Asian Americans feel disrespected and discriminated against in the United States in 2021, according to STATUS, a nationally representative poll designed to raise awareness of Asian Americans and offer ways to enhance their status. Furthermore, according to the survey, 24% of white Americans believe that there is no need for confronting anti-Asian American racism, whereas 37% of white Americans are unaware of the rise in hate crimes and racism against Asian Americans. These numbers were exhibited higher in Republican responses compared to other responses. In 2022, STATUS data shows that younger Asian Americans and Asian American women are less likely to feel accepted and that they belong in U.S. society. Only 19% of Asian Americans aged 18-24, compared to 51% of those over 65, “completely agree that they feel they belong and are accepted.” A lower percentage of Asian American women (27%) than men (33%) feel that they fully belong in the country. Asian Americans were yet again among the racial groups least likely to feel as though they belong in the country in 2023. In the poll, participants were asked to rate their degree of agreement with the following statement: “Personally, I feel like I belong and am accepted in the U.S.” Compared to White Americans, Asian Americans (22%) and Black and Hispanic Americans (24%) feel far less of a sense of belonging.In 2022, 29% of Asian Americans completely agreed with the statement. Finally, in 2024, the survey found that one in two Asian Americans feels unsafe in the U.S. due to their race and/or ethnicity. “Young and female Asian Americans are among the least likely of all racial groups surveyed to feel belonging and acceptance in America”, a trend that was highlighted in 2022. Moreover, similar to the pattern in 2021, almost 80% of Asian Americans do not feel that they truly belong and are accepted. 


Thirdly, anti-Asian speech on platforms like Quora will be assessed in order to operationalize the dependent variable. By obtaining individual experiences and views of Asians across a range of groups, this provides a more comprehensive public perspective. Social media is where many individuals express opinions more freely and interactively; platforms like Quora––where people ask questions and share knowledge––provide insights into common stereotypes, misinformation, and the overall cultural narratives that persist about Asian Americans that reflect overall Anti-Asian sentiments. In addition, the dates range from 2010 to 2021, adding another layer of information that may help operationalize the development of rising anti-Asian sentiments to draw an extensive picture. Based on the data, questions and answers about Asian people have increased steadily between 2010 and 2018 but have since decreased, while Asian hatred questions and answers increased until 2019 but have soared since 2020 following the outbreak of COVID-19. This demonstrates a rising discourse regarding anti-Asian prejudice online, which indicates a rise in anti-Asian sentiment within the US as well. 



Figure 2: Changes in the number of questions and answers about Asian people and Asian hatred from 2010 to 2021 (Number of questions (left), number of answers (right) about “Asian hate” and “Asian”)


Although alternative indicators such as hate crime statistics, advocacy group reports, and surveys measuring public opinion provide valuable insights, those indicators often focus on post-COVID-19 sentiments, potentially skewing the results. In addition, social media trends like those on Twitter may predominantly reflect discussions related to China rather than broader anti-China or anti-Asian sentiments. Thus, the rise of Anti-Asian discourse in social media platforms such as Quora, which spans from 2010-2021, helps summarize the essential meaning of my dependent variable that seeks to answer the question of Anti-Asian sentiment beginning from before the pandemic. 


The variables chosen––lawmakers' discourses, Asian-Americans' sense of belonging, and anti-Asian discussions on social media platforms––are directly relevant to the rise of Anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. A legislative discourse conveys a sense of institutionalized and systematic discrimination by providing an understanding of official attitudes and policy viewpoints. In contrast, Asian Americans’ perspectives and Quora social media discussions provide a more nuanced understanding of societal attitudes and behaviors by capturing public perspectives and individual experiences. Moreover, considering temporal factors, such as pre and post-COVID-19 periods, further underscores the alignment between the chosen dependent variables and the following independent variables. Thus, these three operationalizations effectively capture the underlying concept of the dependent variable. 


INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 

The first independent variable that correlates with the dependent variable, the rise of anti-Asian sentiment in the United States, is the perspective that China is an increasingly threatening national security threat. Thus, my first hypothesis is that the increase in national security threat from China to the U.S. leads to an increase in Anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. I will operationalize this first independent variable of the increase in national security threat from China by delving into the National Security Strategy Document from December 2017 during the presidency of former President Trump. This document will likely demonstrate a hardline view of China and an existential view of the United States. Thus, examining the terminology of anti-China sentiments in official publications and its correlation to the dependent variable (rise in anti-Asian sentiments) will provide insights into if these hostile sentiments show up before the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Other measures of the view of the increase in national security threat from China to the U.S. could include policy statements mentioning China as a national security threat, military posture explicitly linked to concerns about China’s military capabilities or intentions, intelligence assessments discussing China’s activities or capabilities in the context of national security threats, and public opinion surveys to determine perception of China as a significant or growing national security threat and identify trends over time, and media coverage that showcases China being perceived as threatening to national security. 


However, doing a content analysis of Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) Document from December 2017 best captures the underlying concept behind the view of China as an increasingly threatening national security threat for several reasons. First, the President’s National Security Strategy Document will likely state the United States’ official position towards various countries, including China, as it is a document prepared by the executive branch that outlines national security priorities and the corresponding strategies for addressing them. This document will particularly outline the U.S.’ security concerns regarding China, a prominent power. Second, the other options of measures above, including intelligence assessments, public opinion surveys, media coverage, and diplomatic actions, are challenging to determine the ambiguous threshold of whether anti-Asian sentiments have increased before or after the other independent variable of COVID-19. Third, the National Security Strategy document presents an in-depth account of the perceived military, economic, technological, and ideological threats posed by China, reflecting input from multiple U.S. government agencies and sectors. As it is inherently policy-oriented, the NSS outlines strategies to confront these threats, providing insights into the future actions of the U.S. government. Trump’s National Security Strategy provides a top-down, strategic framework that synthesizes inputs from multiple government and advisory sources, carrying significant governmental authority in shaping policy decisions and national security priorities. Investigating this document further may showcase the correlation between the increase in the national security threats and anti-Asian sentiments in the United States. 


Further, the second independent variable that correlates with the dependent variable of the rise of anti-Asian sentiment in the United States is the anti-Chinese sentiment from the rise of the COVID-19 crisis. Thus, my second hypothesis is that the increase in the COVID-19 crisis led to the rise in anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. Since the COVID-19 crisis exacerbated the racist, xenophobic violence and discrimination against Asians and Asian Americans in the United States, we can expect a rise in Anti-Asian sentiment that have led to these violent incidents, targeted against the population. I will be operationalizing this second independent variable through three avenues: anti-Asian political discourse perpetrated by high-elite politicians, political cartoons regarding the COVID-19 crisis, and anti-Asian hate and hateful tweets against Asians and Asian Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic. Other measures of operationalization could include hate crime incidents since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic motivated by anti-Chinese sentiment, discrimination complaints filed alleging discrimination based on Chinese ethnicity or nationality, and public attitudes polling data towards people of Chinese descent about COVID-19. 


However, the measures of anti-Asian political discourse perpetuated by high elite politicians and anti-Asian hate and hateful tweets against Asians and Asian Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic best capture the variable of anti-Chinese sentiments from the rise of the COVID-19 crisis. The alternative measures of hate crime incidents are more closely related to the dependent variable, as it is challenging to differentiate violence motivated by anti-China or anti-Asian hate. In addition, discrimination complaints might help gauge the anti-Chinese sentiments felt by the population. Still, these complaints are frequently not a good measure as these complaints may only be filed in certain circumstances. Many Chinese people might not file these complaints due to the fear of citizenship, green card, visa status, or other repercussions that might require them to leave the country. Moreover, despite the usefulness of public attitudes polling data, implicit bias may operate beyond the person’s awareness and can directly conflict with their beliefs and values, which is why data that accurately captures sentiments can have skewed results that do not accurately reflect the variable. On the other hand, the two former measures encapsulate both how anti-Chinese sentiments are perpetuated in the politics and public sphere, thereby influencing, and aggravating the effects of these sentiments triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. 


Finally, the third independent variable that correlates with the dependent variable of the rise of anti-Asian sentiment in the United States is the rise of white nationalism and the MAGA movement. Thus, my third hypothesis is that the increase of white nationalism and the MAGA movement in the U.S. leads to the increase in Anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. I will operationalize my third variable through two avenues: the increase in the proportion of Republican members of Congress (both in the Senate and House of Representatives) and a growing number of white nationalist organizations and their membership. Other measurements include social media activity pertaining to white nationalism and MAGA, political discourse and policy recommendations that are in line with these beliefs, and surveys of the general public concerning matters concerning race, immigration, and nationalism. 


However, the spike in the proportion of Republican members of Congress reflects a structural shift in the political system. If there’s a notable increase in the proportion of Republican members who espouse ideologies aligned with white nationalism or the MAGA movement, it could suggest a broader societal shift in political representation and priorities. In addition, the growing number of white nationalist organizations and membership measures the organizational strength and support base of white nationalist groups. Here, a rise in the number of such organizations and their membership signifies a growing presence and influence of white nationalism within American society. While social media activity, political rhetoric, and public opinion polls offer valuable insights into the cultural and ideological dimensions of the rise of white nationalism and the MAGA movement, they may not directly capture structural changes within political institutions or the organizational strength of extremist groups that would greatly influence anti-Asian sentiment. 


Research Question: What factors contribute to the increase in anti-Asian sentiment in the United States? 


Hypotheses: 

  • Hypothesis I: The increase in the perceived national security threat from China to the U.S. leads to an increase in anti-Asian sentiment in the U.S. 

  • Hypothesis II: The appearance of the COVID-19 crisis leads to an increase in Anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. 

  • Hypothesis III: The increase of White Nationalism and MAGA Movement in the U.S. leads to Anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. 

Thus, my research will investigate these competing independent variables and the hypothesis that posits that perceived China threat to U.S. national security, the COVID-19 crisis, or/and white nationalism and the MAGA movement’s growth are the factors that potentially correlates and causes increase in anti-Asian sentiments in the United States. 


PART I: PERCEPTION OF CHINA AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT 

Introduction: National Security Strategy 2017 Document 

Based on the first independent variable of the perspective that China is an increasingly threatening national security threat, I analyzed Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy Document. The content analysis of the National Security Strategy reveals a data link between the message (the National Security Strategy) and the receiver (dependent variable chosen capturing anti-Asian sentiment). The document’s ‘Table of Contents’ includes the ‘Introduction’, ‘Four Pillars’, and ‘The Strategy in a Regional Context.’ However, regarding China as a national security threat, I identified three main categories and themes: (1) the America First Principle, (2) Negative Conceptualizations of China, and (3) Non-Negative Conceptualizations of China. Here, I human-coded these categories with the help of NVivo software. 


America First 

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) encapsulated the principle of “America First,” with a strong emphasis on prioritizing peace, prosperity, and security and recognizing vulnerabilities inherent in global engagements and international relations for the United States. The guiding “principled realism,” as noted in the NSS, was predicated on the notion that “During my first year in office, you have witnessed my America First foreign policy in action,” a testament to Trump’s foreign policy that pivots away from ideological conflicts towards outcome-based objectives. The strategy outlines a particular vision: “An America First National Security Strategy is based on American principles, a clear-eyed assessment of U.S. interests, and a determination to tackle the challenges that we face,” underscoring the prioritization of American interests and the strategic deterrence of conflicts. However, there is a mention of prioritizing peace, where the NSS outlines “an America that successfully competes is the best way to prevent conflict. Just as American weakness invites challenge, American strength and confidence deters war and promotes peace.” Thus, this showcases that America wants to deter war and promote peace; conflict with China is discouraged and ultimately, it successfully competes without great conflict with China. 


There is also a great emphasis on promoting America’s prosperity and security and recognizing its vulnerabilities. On the economic and security front, the NSS encapsulates a comprehensive approach to safeguarding American prosperity and enhancing security. Statements within the strategy, such as “America’s response to the challenges and opportunities of the cyber era will determine our future prosperity and security,” highlight the importance of strengthening cyber infrastructures to bolster economic and national security. With an emphasis on building “a strong, defensible cyber infrastructure,” this focus on cyber capabilities shows an acute awareness of its vulnerabilities, especially in a period where perceived antagonistic adversaries like China may exploit its deficiencies. As “rebuilding economic strength at home and preserving a fair and reciprocal international economic system will enhance our security and advance prosperity and peace in the world,” the strategic framework goes beyond defense to encompass leveraging American innovation and economic strength to promote peace and stability globally. Thus, the NSS seeks to create an influential America that actively influences international circumstances that are advantageous to the prosperity both in the United States and the world. 


Negative Conceptualizations 

Negative Conceptualization 1: China as a security threat

The negative conceptualization of China consists of three sub-categories of themes: (1) Depiction of China as a threat, (2) Mentions of China and Russia together, and (3) American willingness to aid other countries due to their perceived China threat. The depiction of China as a threat is omnipresent throughout the document. A few lines into the document, former President Trump addresses “fellow Americans,” noting that “the United States faces an extraordinarily dangerous world, filled with multiple threats that have intensified in recent years.” This encourages the interpretation that China ––along with Russia since these two countries are frequently mentioned as adversaries––are the main referred threats to the United States. The phrase “extraordinarily dangerous” also suggests that the United States’ unipolar power may be decreasing, and China is challenging its global hegemony; thus, this is deemed as an extraordinary threat. In addition, he outlines that “rival powers were aggressively undermining American interests around the globe”; the term “rival” denotes viewing the “other” as a competing threat as they have the same objective or superiority in the same field of activity, thus increasingly trying to defeat or become more successful than the other. Furthermore, Trump illustrates the hope for a “better future [where] we seek for our people and the world by confronting the challenges and dangers posed by those who seek to destabilize the world and threaten America’s people and interests.” However, U.S. interests also include maintaining relations with China as although “China is undermining U.S. interests such as democratic values and economic well-being”, they also need to “establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries,” especially China. 


In addition, the NSS posits that rival actors such as China “advance anti-Western views and spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners.”  This perpetuates the notion that China threatens the unity and stability of Western nations and their alliances and that they will use a deliberate strategy to threaten them. It also explicitly mentions China as a “revisionist power” and challenger of the U.S. that is perceived as a threat to its prosperity and security. Furthermore, the statement “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reach of its state-driven economic model,” implies that the United States perceives China as a threat as it is a rising power threatening its regional hegemony, liberal economic model, and liberal international order. Moreover, the emphasis on the difference between the expectations of the effects of prior U.S. policy on China and the reality of the impact is stark. Although prior U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China” for decades, the document illustrates that “China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others” contrary to their hopes. This includes exploiting data, leveraging extensive data collection and authoritarian practices, increasing military capabilities (which is the most capable and well-funded military in the world after the U.S.), and access to the U.S. innovation economy to advance its global influence and capabilities. As they are “contesting [U.S. ‘s] geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor,” it is evident that the U.S. feels threatened by China’s influence. 


Moreover, they provide examples of specific areas where China may be threatening. This spans from the Chinese government’s infiltration of privacy on its citizens as China combines “data and the use of A.I. to rate the loyalty of its citizens to the state,” using “these ratings to determine jobs” to their general uses of information where they “integrate information derived from personal and commercial sources with intelligence collection and data analytic capabilities based on Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) and machine learning.” This has significant implications of an alarming extensive cyber security threat for the U.S., as their violations of U.S. commercial and government entities could offer adversaries like China access to valuable data and understanding of their desired demographics and target audiences. The NSS also illustrates that China is investing “billions of dollars in infrastructure across the globe, especially in the developing world, to expand influence and gain competitive advantages against the United States,” a threat to the U.S.’s regional hegemony. Further, the NSS presents that China’s use of “economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats” illustrates its multifaceted approach to persuading other states to align with its political and security agenda, directly challenging U.S. interests. Additionally, its “efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea” not only endanger the free flow of trade but also “threaten the sovereignty of other nations” and “undermine regional stability,” posing a clear threat to U.S. allies and interests in the region. China’s rapid military modernization campaign is also explicitly “designed to limit U.S. access to the region,” highlighting the Administration’s perception that China intends to challenge U.S. leadership and assert dominance. Despite China’s portrayal of its ambitions as “mutually beneficial,” the risk of Chinese dominance jeopardizing the sovereignty of states in the Indo-Pacific implies a necessity for a collective response led by sustained U.S. leadership to uphold a regional order based on sovereignty and independence as demonstrated by the NSS. 


Negative Conceptualization 2: China and Russia together 

The second concurrent theme in the document is frequently using the phrase “China-Russia” throughout the document. This suggests these two countries are both perceived in the same sphere of common adversary with similar traits. The first mention of China and Russia together is under the section called “A Competitive World,” where it states that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity” and that “they are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”  This showcases how the United States views both countries as a severe threat to their security regarding trade, military, and information control for both repression within their country and expansion to other countries. Nevertheless, some instances demonstrate that these security precautions are not meant to increase escalation between the three countries (United States, Russia, and China). For instance, it mentions that although the United States will enhance its missile defense, it is not “intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt long-standing strategic relationships with Russia or China.”  This encourages the interpretation that the U.S.’s preference leans more towards competition without violence and fostering ongoing relationships rather than reckless competition that eradicates their relationships with Russia or China. 


U.S.’s concern for their security due to perceived threats from China, however, takes precedence over maintaining strategic relationships with China. This is clearly showcased when discussing advanced weapons and capabilities, where China and Russia are illustrated as developing advanced weapons and capabilities that could threaten [U.S. ‘s] critical infrastructure and our command-and-control architecture.”65 This means that protecting infrastructure and architecture are vital interests to the United States within the realm of security because destruction of them can result in deadly consequences. Explicitly elucidating that “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interest,” the document implies that the United States needs to remain vigilant and assertive in defending its principles and national security against these adversarial forces. This is also demonstrated in the United States’ assertion of their necessity to prepare for the competition that the United States perceives as China and Russia. The document claims that “China, Russia, and other state and non-state actors recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either “at peace” or “at war,” when it is an arena of continuous competition” and that the United States will need to raise their “competitive game to meet that challenge, to protect American interests, and to advance our values,” which might provoke further tension between the two countries. 


Furthermore, “China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally,” signaling an ambition to expand their power beyond their own borders, posing a threat to the United States and the liberal international order that it had established after WWII. They are “fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis,” indicating how the United States perceived China and Russia’s intent to challenge U.S. military dominance and restrict American operations. Finally, China and Russia are also regarded as expanding worldwide, especially by targeting the developing world and aspiring to project power worldwide. Still, they interact most with their neighbors.”  For instance, they also “support the dictatorship in Venezuela and are seeking to expand military linkages and arms sales across the region.” The United States justifies that it is not only the United States that has an interest in confronting these threats but also the hemisphere’s democratic states themselves that have this shared interest to protect their sovereignty. Thus, by coupling the two countries—China and Russia—together, the document underscores their shared status as common adversaries perceived to possess similar traits and intentions, representing a significant threat to United States interests and the established international order. 


Negative Conceptualization 3: U.S.’s willingness to aid other countries due to Chinese Threats 

Finally, the third theme throughout the document is America’s willingness to aid other countries due to the perceived China threat. This includes a variation of regions, specifically Taiwan, but also includes European, Southeast Asian, and African countries. They pledge to “maintain our strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with our “One China” policy, including [their] commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and deter coercion.”  This showcases U.S.’s strategic ambiguity, where Taiwan’s legal status is undetermined, and its strategy of dual deterrence, where it upholds the present status quo by refusing to support Taiwanese independence and cautioning the mainland against using force to secure its goals. In addition, by educating that “China is gaining a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure,” the document asserts that it will encourage European foreign direct investment in the United States to create jobs and work with allies to deter “China’s unfair trade and economic practices and restrict its acquisition of sensitive technologies.”  This shows the cooperative nature of trying to combat Chinese threats with strategic partners. Further, they will “help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region.”  Similarly, as China increases its influence in the South Asian regions, it also promises to help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty. Finally, the NSS claims that “China is expanding its economic and military presence in Africa, growing from a small investor in the continent two decades ago into Africa’s largest trading partner today” and these practices undermine “Africa’s long-term development by corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and debts and commitments.” However, their willingness to aid Africa is an outlier as the document illustrates the threat that China poses for African countries, but doesn't explicitly pledge to aid them. Rather, the U.S. outlines its aspirations and “seeks sovereign African states that are integrated into the world economy, able to provide for their citizens’ needs, and capable of managing threats to peace and security.”


Non-Negative Conceptualizations 

Nevertheless, there are few non-negative conceptualizations of China in Trump’s National Security Strategy in 2017. The NSS elucidates that “competition does not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict.” This encourages the interpretation that just because there is competition between the United States and China, it doesn’t mean it will escalate into a hostile situation or turn into open conflict. Rather, competition and peace can coexist and even be constructive, encouraging cooperation, fostering innovation and progress in different areas and contexts. Furthermore, the previously mentioned statement further bolsters the strategy's focus on maintaining long-standing strategic relationships with China or Russia while emphasizing that the United States' expanded missile defense capabilities shouldn't per se be utilized to jeopardize their security. However, this strategic relationship is also challenged by the fact that some states, including China, again “recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either “at peace” or “at war,” when it is an arena of continuous competition” and not fight in the U.S.’s terms. Thus, Trump’s strategy implies raising U.S.’s competitive game to meet that challenge, protect American interests, and advance their values. 


Additionally, there are implications of hope for cooperation. The document outlines how “together with our allies, partners, and aspiring partners, the United States will pursue cooperation with reciprocity,” where China may be included in the aspiring partnership. True cooperation in international trade involves partners sharing responsibilities and burdens equitably, as stated in the statements “cooperation means sharing responsibilities and burdens” and “trade, fair and reciprocal relationships benefit all with equal levels of market access and opportunities for economic growth.” It is expected that trade agreements in such a cooperative framework will be just and reciprocal, giving all parties equal access to each other's markets and the opportunity to gain from economic growth. Applying this to the concept to the possibility of China as a strategic prominent business partner for the U.S., the strategy proposes that both countries stand to gain from trade as long as they simultaneously engage in mutual respect for reciprocity and fairness. This means that in their trade relationships, both countries would ideally share the responsibilities and burdens associated with maintaining these relationships, such as adhering to agreed-upon trade practices, resolving trade disputes amicably, and providing equal market access to each other’s goods and services. 


However, the caveat is that “although the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence of the world’s most destructive weapons across the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.” This showcases that this relationship is fraught with complexities and challenges. While the United States seeks cooperation, it also has to negotiate pressing issues about its own security and regional stability, highlighted by China's proliferation of weapons and employment of economic tactics. This strategy makes it clear that dealing with China as a security challenge, as opposed to a partner, remains more pertinent and necessitates quick action to prevent overlooking or undermining pivotal security concerns for the United States. 


Other Observations 

It is also critical to note the number of mentions of various countries regarded as adversaries or perceived threats in the 2017 NSS. In this graph, I included China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and Syria as countries that the United States regards and identifies as security threats. The results show that China is mentioned the highest with 16 mentions, followed by Russia at 13 mentions, Iran at 11 mentions, North Korea at 11 mentions, Iraq at 6 mentions, and Syria at six mentions. It is apparent, therefore, that China is deemed the highest threat to the United States as it has the highest mentions in the NSS document. 


Figure 3: Number of Mentions of Dif erent Countries Regarded as Perceived Threats in NSS 


In addition, the reference point for the surge in anti-Asian sentiment preceding the COVID-19 pandemic can be pinpointed to the characterization of China as a revisionist state, notably introduced during Trump’s National Security Strategy in 2017. This marked the first official mention of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a revisionist state in a U.S. national security document, as this term was absent from Obama’s previous NSS documents in 2015 and 2010. Thus, a consistent narrative emerged in the 2017 NSS regarding China’s perceived challenge to the established rule-based international order and fundamental American values. This sentiment culminated in significant statements highlighting China’s perceived threat to global, essentially American norms. This encourages the hypothesis that this period represents a significant turning point in the escalation of anti-Asian sentiment, with the framing of China as a primary adversary. 


Conclusion 

Thus, the analysis of Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy Document demonstrates the positive correlation between the increasing Anti-Asian sentiment and the perception of China as an increasingly 

threatening national security threat. The analysis of Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy Document essentially illuminates the United States’ view of China as a security threat and its strategic response. Three key categories emerged by human coding via NVivo: “America First,” emphasizing U.S. interests and stability; “Negative Conceptualizations of China,” highlighting concerns about China’s actions and intentions; and “Non-Negative Conceptualizations of China,” the recognition of potential cooperation despite competition. While the document underscores challenges posed by China, it also hints at diplomatic avenues and fair-trade partnerships, suggesting a nuanced approach to managing tensions while promoting mutual respect and reciprocity in international relations. However, it is evident that the security threat is significantly more underscored than the cooperation, showcased by the nature and the frequency of the number of statements suggesting China as a hostile adversary that threatens the security of the United States. 


There seems to be a clear correlation between the portrayal of China as a security threat in presidential discourse and the rise of anti-Asian sentiment, which has manifested as discriminatory behavior and violence towards Asian Americans. This trend is showcased by the documented discussions of Asian Americans by U.S. lawmakers on social media from 2016 to 2022. The release of the National Security Strategy Document in December 2017, which portrayed China as a threat to national security, has significant implications for how American society perceives China and Asian Americans. Political discourse has a significant influence on societal biases, as demonstrated by the positive association found between the perception of China as an increasing threat to U.S. national security and the rise in anti-Asian sentiment. Furthermore, the heightened anti-Asian sentiment that emerged in 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic may be primarily ascribed to President Trump's portrayal of China as a revisionist state, a description absent from prior national security strategies like Obama's. This portrayal of China as the primary adversary has increased pre-existing tensions and prejudices, marking a critical turning point in the rise of anti-Asian sentiment. 


PART II: APPEARANCE OF COVID-19 CRISIS 

Introduction: Senators and Political Cartoons 

To examine if the second independent variable of the appearance of COVID-19 affects the rise of Anti-Asian sentiment in the United States, I analyze statements made by influential political figures during the pandemic’s rise to see if the second independent variable. Specifically, I pay particular consideration to statements made by Senators John Cornyn and Marsha Blackburn as well as political cartoons that associate China with the issue at hand. Finally, I also review past studies that have investigated Anti-Asian rhetoric aggravated by the COVID-19 crisis in social media. I discover a correlation between the anti-Asian sentiment level and the messaging of these through content analysis 


Senator Marsha Blackburn: China’s 5,000 Years of Cheating and Stealing

On December 3rd, 2020, Tennessee Senator Marsha Blackburn tweeted, “China has a 5,000-year history of cheating and stealing. Some things never change…”  Prior to this tweet, the Senator publicly thanked President Trump on Twitter for banning cotton produced by Uyghur forced labor, emphasizing the U.S. stance against supporting companies that profit from slave labor.  According to WMOT News, Blackburn has consistently criticized China daily for months, covering topics ranging from the origins of COVID-19 to trade matters. In response, a reporter from the state-owned China Daily in Washington DC responded by using a derogatory term to describe Senator Blackburn, calling her “the most racist and ignorant U.S. Senator I have seen.”  Statements like Senator Blackburn’s can fuel discriminatory attitudes and behaviors towards people of Chinese descent in the United States, which can manifest in explicit acts of discrimination or more subtle forms of bias in policymaking, social interactions, and media representations. It's also critical to understand that this particular form of racism is just as detrimental as overt forms of racial prejudice because it targets historical events, cultural norms, and national origin. Furthermore, when influential politicians such as Senator Marsha Blackburn express such sentiments, it can normalize prejudice against Asians and Asian Americans and lead to justifications for discrimination. 


In addition, this is an example of how COVID-19 opened the door to a range of criticisms of China. In 2019, the U.S. Senator, Marsha Blackburn proposed legislation to prohibit foreign adversaries from accessing the U.S. information and communications technology marketplace, including its supply chain.  However, after the appearance and escalation of the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, there was much more action toward China, as it was easier to justify it as a threatening adversary. Senator Blackburn spearheaded several initiatives, such as restricting foreign adversaries from accessing the U.S. information technology and communication markets. The COVID-19 crisis was a catalyst for more measures against China, including discontinuing the export of crowd control equipment to Hong Kong and urging the International Olympic Committee to uphold human rights during the 2022 Beijing Olympics.  She addressed concerns about Chinese-run Confucius Institutes on American universities and supported bringing pharmaceutical production back to the United States from China. Moreover Senator Blackburn has raised skepticism on China's ties to global institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO).  She introduced resolutions demanding accountability for China’s cover-up of the COVID-19 outbreak and allowed Americans affected by the pandemic to sue Chinese officials. Additionally, she condemned China’s human rights abuses, particularly towards Uyghur Muslims, and criticized China’s inclusion on a UN Human Rights Council panel. Senator Blackburn pushed for measures to combat censorship and internet restrictions worldwide, citing worries about trade and technology. She underlined that in order to mitigate economic vulnerabilities, U.S. supply chains must be realigned away from China. As she argued for severing connections with Beijing, Senator Blackburn emphasized how critical it is to combat Communist China's influence. Thus, Senator Blackburn's actions reflect a broader shift in attitudes towards China, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which opened the door to a wider range of anti-Asian and anti-China terminology, as well as increased criticism of China in other spheres. 


Furthermore, since the COVID-19 epidemic, there has been a spike in the stigmatization and prejudice against Asian groups owing to the usage of language that derogatorily links the virus to China. By insinuating that Chinese people and their government are inherently dishonest, Blackburn's statement may reinforce these prejudices by placing disproportionate responsibility on China for the pandemic while ignoring other complex international and scientific variables. Furthermore, comments of this kind might encourage bigotry and xenophobia as the pandemic remains to fuel anxieties and tensions throughout the world. These feelings can be demonstrated through violence against Asian Americans, both physically and verbally, which have increased since the pandemic commenced. Such discourse perpetuates the notion that "deceptive acts" are not limited to particular people or regimes, but rather, are reflective of an entire ethnicity or nationality. 

A nonpartisan coalition of prominent Chinese Americans from a range of industries, including business, government, academia, science, technology, and the arts, known as Committee of 100 condemned Senator Blackburn's most recent tweet “derogatory and xenophobic.”  The Committee has requested the Senator to remove the tweet because it deems that the racially charged language has an immediate and detrimental impact on the Chinese American population. Senator Marsha Blackburn's claim that China has a 5,000-year history of dishonest behavior may have fueled harmful racial stereotypes of Asian Americans and Chinese people, aggravating anti-Asian sentiment and discrimination against individuals of Chinese descent in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. 


Senator John Cornyn: Criticism of China for Eating Snakes 

In March 2020, the inception of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, Senator Cornyn defended former President Trump’s use of “the Chinese virus” to describe the novel coronavirus. Moreover, he attributed blame to China for the disease and several other viral outbreaks. Cornyn asserted to reporters that “China is to blame because of the culture where people consume bats, snakes, and dogs, which facilitates the transmission of viruses from animals to humans. That’s why China has been the origin of many of these viruses, such as SARS, MERS, and the Swine Flu.” Democrats and critics quickly denounced the Senator’s remarks as racist across social media platforms. Furthermore, the Texas Democratic Party accused Cornyn of “dog-whistling” and urged him to prioritize efforts to curb the spread of COVID-19. 


Senator Cornyn’s defense of using terms like “the Chinese virus” and his attribution of blame to China for the COVID-19 pandemic echo broader implications for rising anti-Asian sentiment in the United States during this time. According to the Pew Research Center, “about one-third of Asian adults (32%) say they personally know an Asian person in the U.S. who has been threatened or attacked because of their race or ethnicity since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020.”  By associating the virus with China and emphasizing cultural practices, such as eating habits as the cause, this statement has a risk of fueling discrimination against people of Asian descent. This type of rhetoric can perpetuate harmful stereotypes and scapegoating, leading to increased incidents of racism and prejudice against Asian Americans. The immediate criticism of Cornyn’s comments as racist underscores the acknowledgment of the sensitivity and urgency of addressing such racist-charged statements by high political figures, analogous to the tweet by Senator Marsha Blackburn. 


Katie Shepard, a Metro reporter covering Maryland politics and government, claims that aside from the controversial language, the Senator’s comment is “either wrong or leaves out important context.” Although the first strain of coronavirus that originated in China caused the 2003 SARS epidemic, neither the 2012 MERS outbreak nor the 2009 swine flu epidemics started there. According to WHO, MERS, “Middle East Respiratory Syndrome,” was first identified in Saudi Arabia in 2012, and according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the 2009 Swine flu pandemic had its first case recorded in the U.S. Furthermore, none of the diseases he mentions are linked to drugs and snakes; bats carry coronaviruses, but “another animal usually catches the virus from a bat before passing it on to a human.” While there is no scientific evidence to support the claim that consuming Chinese dishes or cuisine that includes bat, snake, or dog meat has directly caused the transmission of coronavirus, SARS, MERS, or swine flu, it is concerning that this statement perpetuates harmful stereotypes. This generates a contentious narrative that highlights cultural differences and denigrates particular dietary habits. This may result in prejudice and xenophobia towards people of Asian heritage. As such, it's critical to promote mutual understanding and collaboration while tackling global health issues as opposed to fostering negative preconceptions and escalating discrimination. The implications of rising Anti-Asian sentiment are especially salient in light of recent racist statements made by elite politicians about China. 


Similar to Senator Marsha Blackburn, his criticism of China has included various issues, not just the COVID-19 crisis. In 2017, Senator Cornyn planned a bill to give CFIUS more power to address China’s investment threat. However, after 2020, there was a further increase in criticisms and actions taken against China. In August 2020, he introduced a resolution to condemn Chinese aggression at the India-China line of actual control. Just a few months after, Senator Cornyn and Menendez introduced a bipartisan resolution to designate Uyghur human rights abuses by China as genocide. This demonstrates how, within a year after the appearance of COVID-19, there was an apparent rise in criticism of China. In the years which followed, Senator Cornyn's bill to safeguard American transportation infrastructure from Chinese espionage was ratified in 2023, and in 2024, he and his other supporters submitted a bill to implement the consequences of China's invasion of Taiwan. Thus, it is evident that in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, criticisms against China has intensified in regards to both national and international security. 


COVID-19 Political Cartoons 

In addition to analyzing remarks made by public officials, I will also examine political cartoons that suitably address the COVID-19 predicament and China's role as a reservoir for the virus. I will specifically be analyzing three political cartoons from the following two sources: (1) Beijing Olympics boycotts; (2) China Dragon Sick Symptom; and (3) Coronavirus Fear.  Through the analysis of these political cartoons, I aim to shed light on general sentiment and political discourse influenced by the COVID-19 outbreak and its connection to China. 


Political Cartoon 1: Fear of the coronavirus 


Figure 4: Fear of Coronavirus (Chappatte Global Cartoon) 


The “Fear of the Coronavirus” cartoon from Chappatte Global Cartoon effectively conveys the widespread fear that people have about the COVID-19 pandemic and its link to Chinese-made products. The visually arresting image illustrates a woman behind the pharmacy counter in the cartoon, who doesn't appear to be concerned with the possibility of infection given that she isn't wearing a mask and appears nonchalant. A customer who seems frightened and is wearing a mask stands in stark contrast to this. Upon closer investigation, the box that the customer is holding turns out to be empty, and is highlighted as the main subject of the animation. This concept is further emphasized by the inscription “Made in China” on the box, which attributes the blame of the lack of masks to the origin of China, which is also perceived as the origin of the virus. The background's drugstore shelves and the green cross, symbolizing a pharmaceutical center, provide additional context. Overall, the cartoon shocawcases the urgent need for protective equipment during the pandemic. 


Published on February 3, 2020, this cartoon references the anti-Asian sentiment that spiked during the pandemic. The cartoon may reflect underlying biases or assumptions regarding the quality of products from China by depicting Chinese-made masks as ineffective. This portrayal might encourage unfavorable opinions about Chinese people or companies, which would encourage xenophobia and prejudice. Thus, in addition to addressing issues with product dependability and international supply chains, the cartoon additionally emphasizes on the expanding anti-Asian and anti-China prejudice that has arisen during the COVID-19 pandemic. 


Political Cartoon 2: Boycotts of Beijing Games 


Figure 5: Boycotts of Beijing Games (Chappatte Global Cartoon)


This cartoon, titled “Boycotts of Beijing Games” from Chappatte Global Cartoon, provokes the consideration of the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in the context of the upcoming 2022 Beijing Olympics. The cartoon is set in the United Nations General Assembly Hall and features the coronavirus symbol personified as an individual standing at a podium, addressing the audience. Speaking from a document it holds, the virus declares its stance on the Beijing Olympics: 'As for us, we will not boycott the 2022 Beijing Olympics.' This aspect of the cartoon invites readers to analyze the pandemic's influence on global affairs and decision-making critically. 


By representing the virus as a character speaking at a global forum like the United Nations General Assembly Hall, the cartoonist highlights the pervasive influence and impact of the pandemic on international affairs. The cartoon emphasizes that the pandemic has become a significant player in geopolitical decision-making by attributing speech and agency to the virus. The audience members in masks reinforce the severity of the pandemic and the steps being taken to prevent its spread. This implies how the Beijing games lend itself to an environment that is conducive to spread the virus, which is why the virus character in the cartoon is condoning the execution of the games. The characters sitting on the chairs, presumably representing various nations, highlight the importance of decisions made by the international community regarding the pandemic and major events, such as the Olympics. 


The virus character’s decision to declare its position on the Beijing Olympics carries symbolic weight, reflecting the complex interplay between public health concerns, political considerations, and economic interests. The statement indicates that economic and diplomatic relationships should take precedence over public health imperatives, and it implies contempt for calls to boycott the Olympics because of concerns about China's handling of the pandemic or other human rights issues. All things considered, the cartoon offers a compelling perspective of the complex issues raised by the COVID-19 epidemic, demonstrating how it has altered worldwide debate and global priorities. 


Political Cartoon 3: China Dragon Sick Symptom 


Figure 6: China Dragon Sick Symptom (Ben Garrison) 


Ben Garrison's political cartoon emphasizes broader issues of racism and xenophobia while criticizing China's role in the COVID-19 outbreak through the use of a potent visual metaphor. The main character of the cartoon is a dragon, which symbolizes China. The dragon's sickly and nauseating appearance serves as a symbol of the perceived origin of the pandemic. The cartoon implies that China's dietary habits and culture are to blame for the virus's spread since the dragon looks sick, lightheaded, and constipated after consumption of these diets. Numerous animals including cats, dogs, pigs, turtles, bats, snakes, and pigs, have been suggested as potential COVID-19 transmission sources, and are displayed on the dragon's plate. 


The context regarding Ben Garrison's controversial reputation offers nuance to how the cartoon should be seen. Several of Garrison's cartoons have generated controversy, with accusations of racism, misogyny, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, and he is known as one of the most prominent American right-wing political cartoonists and artists. The picture is reminiscent of overtly racist political cartoons from the 19th century that propagated anti-Chinese immigration policies linked to “unnatural” foods and disease. Hence, anti-Chinese emotion in public discourse has a historical precedent, which this cartoon depicts. This hostile sentiment may have been reinforced by Garrison's work and heightened anti-Asian prejudice. 


Past Social Media Analysis 

There have also been studies that investigated how social media has influenced discourse about COVID-19. For instance, Cao, Lindo, and Zhong assessed the impact of Donald Trump’s “Chinese Virus” tweets on the increase in anti-Asian incidents. According to their findings, there was a noticeable spike in anti-Asian acts and violence after Trump's initial comments and an increase in searches for the phrase online. By adopting “difference-in-differences and event-study analyses with spatial variation,” they discovered that the counties that supported Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election exhibited a higher incidence of anti-Asian events compared to those that supported Hillary Clinton. These findings illustrate the correlation between party preferences and the frequency of anti-Asian events, underscoring the broader social ramifications of political discourse and its influence on prejudiced actions. Furthermore, a study by Chong and Chen found that Trump was primarily responsible for the hashtags #Chinavirus and #Chinesevirus on Twitter networks, corroborating earlier research that the public communication strategy of the political elites to divert public attention from the facing the suffering and hardships from the new disease. Another study also illustrates how after “the China Virus” went viral, there was an evident racially charged Coronavirus coverage and trends in bias against Asian Americans that increased nationalism sentiments. This study provides compelling evidence that the use of stigmatizing language amplifies perceptions of Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners. According to research demonstrating how this bias can fuel discriminatory behavior, and the well-documented link between discrimination and adverse mental and physical health outcomes, stigmatizing media has an adverse effect on Asian American health and welfare. 


Moreover, other studies showed how “pandemic nationalism” was born, as the use of government social media for political information and belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories in China may have exacerbated the situation. The findings suggested a correlation between utilizing government social media for political information and increased endorsement of nation-specific COVID-19 conspiracy theories, directly and through various pathways involving nationalism.  Building on previous studies, these results highlight the U.S. government’s social media usage and how nationalism influences beliefs in conspiracy theories, further increasing anti-Asian sentiments and violence in the United States after the appearance and rise of the COVID-19 crisis. 


Conclusion 

This comprehensive analysis explores the connection between political discourse, media representation, and the emergence of anti-Asian sentiment during the COVID-19 pandemic. Analyzing statements made by prominent politicians, including Senators Marsha Blackburn and John Cornyn, as well as political cartoons and previous social media research, reveals a number of important themes. First, the utilization of demeaning vocabulary targeted towards China by political figures perpetuates negative perceptions and prejudices about Asian cultures. The statements made by Senators Blackburn and Cornyn demonstrate how such forms of language could promote prejudice and hatred. Likewise, political cartoons such as the ones under analysis serve as visual media that both mirror and reinforce existing prejudices. Further previous studies highlight the relationship between political communication, nationalism, and the adoption of COVID-19 conspiracy theories via social media, further exacerbating anti-Asian sentiments. Therefore, it is apparent that the appearance of the COVID-19 crisis and the rise in anti-Asian sentiment in the US are correlated. Politicians exploited the outbreak as an opportunity for criticizing China on issues of trade, human rights, and security in addition to its responsibility in the crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic and an upsurge in anti-Asian sentiments are undoubtedly connected, underscoring the impact of political discourse and media representation on public sentiment. The dependent variable, which may represent a governmental perspective, is the social media discourse by US lawmakers about Asian Americans from 2016 to 2022. On the other hand, statistics from 2021 to 2024 could offer information about how Asian Americans view their own social integration and sense of belonging. 


PART III: INCREASE IN WHITE NATIONALISM AND MAGA MOVEMENT 

Introduction: White Nationalism and MAGA Movement 

Finally, I investigate the correlation between the third variable—growing white nationalism and the MAGA movement—and the escalation of anti-Asian sentiment in the US. I examine themes including the association between Christian white nationalism, violence, and fear; Trump's political language; the MAGA movement; the number of Republican members of Congress; and the expansion of white nationalist organizations. An alarming growth in Christian nationalist sentiment is indicated by recent research that demonstrates a significant correlation between Christian nationalism and white nationalism. This convergence with white supremacist viewpoints, highlighted by individuals such as the former President Trump, has exacerbated anti-Asian prejudice during the COVID-19 pandemic and promoted racial fear and discrimination. Further, the prevalence of white nationalist beliefs within the Republican Party underscores how deeply entrenched racial prejudices are across all levels of government. 


Christian White Nationalism, Fear, and Violence 

Studies have shown that there is a strong correlation between Christian nationalism and white nationalism. The latest PRRI/Brookings Christian Nationalism Survey, surveying over 6,000 Americans, highlights the escalating concern about Christian nationalism in the United States. The findings reveal that 10% of Americans fit the criteria for Christian nationalism adherents, as outlined by the study’s comprehensive measurement scale. Furthermore, 19% of those surveyed identify as sympathizers for Christian nationalism, indicating the increasing acceptance of Christian nationalist principles in mainstream society. According to the most recent poll on Christian nationalism, the movement is associated with white nationalist groups because it harbors a latent racist worldview. These organizations spread white nationalist ideas by combining traditional and contemporary narratives. Furthermore, Christians who support Christian nationalism frequently have unfavorable opinions about immigrants and racial/ethnic minorities. 


Moreover, Christian nationalists are less inclined to acknowledge racism as an ongoing issue in American society. A significant majority—66% of white Christian nationalism sympathizers and 81% of adherents—subscribe to the replacement theory, which posits that immigrants are “invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background.”  This also has significant implications for psychological ramifications of swift demographic and cultural shifts that can prompt certain white individuals, particularly those already grappling with instability, disenfranchisement, and hardship, to seek validation for their fears from groups. These groups then shape these fears into a sense of “aggravated entitlement and moral outrage.”  Additionally, a recent study published in Ethnic and Racial Studies revealed that Christian nationalism emerged as the most potent predictor of COVID-related anti-Asian racism and xenophobic rhetoric.  This surge in anti-Asian sentiment, especially by white Christian nationalists, poses a formidable challenge that may require years, if not generations, to dismantle. 


The rising Christian white nationalism inevitably poses a significant problem for people of color, especially regarding violence. In addition to demonizing and condemning the current state in which white people are in, white nationalists idealize a history in which white people predominated, and concurrently glorify the abilities and virtues of white Americans. This contradictory worldview frequently has perilous results, such as instigating violence against people who are perceived as threats to white privilege and resources or, in extreme situations, even calling for civil war. Extremism and violence are strategies that white supremacists use to hinder social progress and block initiatives aimed at improving life for communities of color, which has tremendous implications for the rising Anti-Asian violence that has been exacerbated since the COVID-19 crisis. American democracy, as well as the Asian American community are seriously at risk from this spike in violent crimes. Notably, 16% of Americans agreed with the PRRI/Brookings Christian Nationalism Survey that “true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save our country because things have gotten so far off track.” Asian Americans also consider white nationalism as a grave issue; the African American Research Collaborative (AARC) reports that, after Black respondents, “Asian Americans are the next most concerned with white nationalism at 71%” from the 2022 Midterm Voter Election Poll. 


In particular, Carol M. Swain, professor of political science and law at Vanderbilt University, argues that there is a surge in new nationalists who are dangerous; these nationalists “find a willing audience among mainstream white Americans who are reacting to a new set of conditions”, including “changing demographics, and the recognition that the country will soon no longer be majority white; globalization, and the resultant loss of jobs in the United States; racial preferences that now encompass more of the population than in the past; the language of multiculturalism; identity politics; concerns about black crime; technological advances such as the Internet, which make it easier for like-minded people to reach each other; and liberal immigration policies.”  Thus, she asserted that a combination of these factors has fueled fear and desperation among good, ordinary whites, thereby resulting in unprecedented racial tensions and conflicts. 


White supremacy remains rife in the U.S., leading to violence and intimidation to influence conservative political agendas. The ideologies of white nationalism and Christian nationalism are increasingly intertwined, both propagating the belief that whiteness is “being erased and attacked” by so-called far-left activists and political leaders. Thus, this leads them to rely on violence and intimidation to harm non-white individuals they perceive as a threat. 


Trump White Nationalism and MAGA Movement 

White nationalism and supremacy have been made possible in large part by the former president Donald Trump, particularly with the MAGA movement. Following his election in 2017, Trump's rhetoric and his staffing and policy decisions combined strengthened white nationalist sentiment and gained support among a significant proportion of the white population. Consequently, Trump has provided an unprecedented platform for white nationalists within the contemporary political landscape. Beyond the president himself, however, prominent members of his administration also actively promoted these ideas, including former senior adviser Stephen Miller. 


A lot of psychologists studying bias and discrimination claim that people are not necessarily “rational” beings but “rationalizing” ones.  While many voters recognize Trump’s immoral and unethical behavior, they rationalize their decisions by citing his appointments of conservative judges, stance on anti-abortion legislation, efforts to overturn unfair trade agreements and tax policies, and commitment to protecting the Second Amendment. According to Sue, although these issues are legitimate, they might obscure a more troubling reality: “the bigoted beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of Donald Trump do not represent an isolated case or an “outlier,” but may reflect the unconscious values of a large segment of the population” of the United States. This showcases how this may not be merely the beliefs of Trump but also the rising white nationalism and MAGA movement that is becoming increasingly apparent. 


White supremacy can be defined as the “individual, institutional and societal belief in the superiority of white Western-European cultural heritage (physical features, fair skin color, arts, crafts, traditions, customs, holidays, religion, language, beliefs, values, etc.) over all other groups and their heritage.”  The slogan “Make America Great Again!” camouflages white supremacy and a desire to revert to a romanticized past where marginalized individuals were expected to “know their place.”  This encourages the perpetuation and normalization of racially discriminatory attitudes and practices, subtly reinforcing an exclusionary vision of America’s future that privileges a specific racial hierarchy. In a similar vein, “White nationalism advocates for a physical or spiritual white state.”  This extremist ideology, along with the concept of white supremacy, seeks to establish white dominance through exclusionary policies and discriminatory practices that Trump was able to utilize as a political tool to garner support. However, so as to preserve their reputation, politicians frequently steer away from being directly associated with white nationalism. Instead, they use subtle signals to appeal to supporters without alienating moderates. In contrast, Trump is a notable example of someone who utilizes this overt approach and openly embraces this ideology. 


Thus, racial hate and discrimination has been exacerbated in the United States through the combination of white supremacist beliefs with mainstream political discourse, as individuals like President Trump have demonstrated. This discourse, which frequently propagates conspiracy theories and demonizes immigrants, has contributed to an increase in xenophobic and anti-Asian sentiments as well as anti-immigrant sentiment. The COVID-19 pandemic contributed to this environment by attributing the virus a scapegoat and erroneously linking it to the general Asian community. Thus, there has been a substantial rise in anti-Asian hate crimes and discrimination. 


Increase in White Nationalism in Congress and White Nationalist Groups It is imperative to note that Christian nationalism is a more common ideology within the Republican party. According to a new survey, researchers have found that “half of Republicans believe the country should be a strictly Christian nation, either adhering to the ideals of Christian nationalism (21%) or sympathizing with those views (33%).” As Christian nationalism and white nationalism are very much related as elucidated prior, it can be inferred that Republican parties tend to have more white nationalist sentiments than the Democratic party. Therefore, I examine the composition of the political parties in Congress in 2016, a year which appears to be significant as it comes prior to Trump's election to office. This will provide insightful information about the ideological context that prevailed before his election and may also illuminate a white nationalist movement that emerged at this time. In 2016, the Republican Party held 54 Senate seats, Democrats held 44, and two seats were held by independents caucusing with Democrats heading into the Senate election. Despite 24 Republican seats and 10 Democratic seats up for re-election, the Democrats failed to gain the five seats needed to regain the majority they lost in 2014. The majority of Republican incumbents who are running for reelection in 2016 were first elected in the wake of the Tea Party movement in 2010. Similarly, the Republican Party held a majority in the House of Representatives before to the election, with 246 seats to the Democrats' 186, with three seats unfilled. Despite losing six seats in 2016, Republicans maintained their majority, ending with a 241-194 lead.129 According to a study that tested how white nationalists influence Congressional representative conservatism by examining “distributions of white nationalist groups in the American South against Congressional representative conservatism from 2010–2017,” analyses reveal that “white nationalists indeed appear to significantly impact representative radical conservatism, even controlling for numerous factors commonly theorized to explain their rise.”  The Southern Poverty Law Center reports a historical high of 1,021 white nationalist, neo-Nazi, and anti-government extremist groups in 2018, 940 in 2019, 838 in 2020, and 733 in 2019. 


In addition, Weiner and Zelman’s results strongly support the “proposition that white nationalist activities at the Congressional district level in election years have a significant and substantive influence upon the radical conservatism of elected Congressional representatives in the American South.”  This showcases how the majority Republican seats held in both the Senate and House of Representatives in 2016 encourage the indication of the rise in white nationalist sentiments in the government that may manifest in many different levels in both the discourse, policies, and the public. 


Conclusion 

Research has demonstrated a strong association between Christian nationalism and white nationalism, suggesting that the Christian nationalist movement is imbued with racist ideology that enables it to collaborate with white nationalist groups. Because of this intertwined ideology, which perpetuates the idea of the model minority and marginalizes Asian groups facing poverty and underemployment, negative sentiments against immigration and racial/ethnic minorities are further cultivated. Unfortunately, the MAGA Movement and the rise of Trump's white nationalism have normalized racial discriminatory attitudes and behaviors, fostering an environment of fear and prejudice. Furthermore, this trend is made exacerbated by the growing influence of Christian white nationalism in the Republican Party, which has an impact on congressional representational conservatism. As a result, the current political environment is conducive to the spread of white nationalist ideas, which can appear on a variety of discourse, policies, and public sentiment. It is apparent that data from various sources all point to the correlation between white nationalism and the rise of Anti-Asian sentiments in the United States. 


DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 

In this paper, I ask the research question “What factors contribute to the rise of anti-Asian sentiment in the United States?” I investigated three hypotheses: (1) an increase in perceived national security threat from China to the U.S. leads to an increase in Anti-Asian sentiment in the United States, (2) the appearance of COVID-19 crisis leads to an increase in Anti-Asian sentiment in the United States, (3) increase of White Nationalism and MAGA Movement in the U.S. leads to Anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. 


In my analysis and research, I find a strong correlation between the dependent variable of rising anti-Asian sentiment and the three independent variables in the hypotheses. Analyzing Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy Document reveals a focus on China as a security threat, which has implications for increased discrimination against Asian Americans in American society. Political rhetoric, media portrayal, and past social media studies all contribute to understanding the correlation between the appearance of the COVID-19 crisis and the rise in anti-Asian sentiment. Moreover, the intertwining of Christian nationalism and white nationalism, particularly within the Republican Party, further fuels this trend, as evidenced by recent research linking Christian nationalism to COVID-related racism against Asians. These developments also underscore the troubling correlation between white nationalism and the MAGA movement launched by Trump and the increasing anti-Asian sentiments in the United States. Furthermore, this suggests that while the National Security Strategy holds greater significance for politicians, both politicians and the public are affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This is evidenced by the analysis of the dependent variable, which observed heightened discussions about Asian Americans on social media from 2016 to 2022, following the release of Trump’s National Security Strategy in 2017, which emphasized national security issues. Additionally, the perception of Asian Americans and their sense of belonging from 2021 to 2024 were notably impacted by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and are also affected by the various politicians’ rhetoric about the responsibility that China needs to bear in response to the COVID-19 crisis, which opened to more doors and possibilities to criticize China. 


Furthermore, I found that the correlation between the rise of white nationalism and increasing anti-Asian sentiment, particularly evident prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, underscores a disturbing trend in American society due to various conditions that put the white working class at a disadvantage. The exploitation of white nationalist sentiments by figures like Trump, through coded language and dog-whistling, has further exacerbated these tensions. While COVID-19 provided a significant boost to anti-Asian sentiments and may have been the main critical explanation for the escalation of anti-Asian sentiments, it’s crucial to recognize that the pandemic did not solely trigger this phenomenon but rather rooted in pre-existing nationalist ideologies. My analysis suggests that anti-Asian sentiments are further influenced by nationalist security threats, COVID-19, and white nationalism, underscoring the convoluted interplay between societal forces and xenophobic attitudes. Overall, my research demonstrates the relative impact of all three independent variables. Hence, my research indicates that no hypothesis is more valid than the other; rather, the reasons for the rise of anti-Asian sentiments can be attributed to a confluence of all three variables, which have been influencing the independent data in different complex ways and scales over time. 


Furthermore, there needs to be ongoing research about the intersectionality between white nationalism, socio-economic disparities, and anti-Asian sentiment, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has highlighted systemic inequalities. Moreover, understanding how political figures utilize nationalist rhetoric to exploit these sentiments is crucial in addressing and combating xenophobia and Anti-Asian sentiment and violence both domestically and internationally. Ultimately, there needs to be more research that guides policies required to understand the multifaceted nature of these issues and their broader implications for social cohesion and equality, as this alarming trend has significant implications on Asian American communities’ well-being, sense of belonging, and safety, and requires immediate attention to combat discrimination and promote inclusion. 


Photo: Ringo Chiu/AFP Via Getty Images


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